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WATER BOUNDARIES, TIDE AND SHORE LAND RIGHTS
JOHN SCOTT OBENOUR, JR.*
W ATERPRONT PROPERTY, though extremely popular in Washington,
presents problems of ownership with which few residents are
familiar. The effect of transitory water boundaries upon the -divisible
proprietary interests is especially complex since the present status of
such boundaries is uncertain under our court's interpretation of the
applicable statutes.
I. RIGHTS AND TITLES UNDER FEDERAL AND
STATE THEORIES
A. Theories Based upon Riparian Rights: Tide and shore land legis-
lation in the United States has proceeded upon two theories depending
upon whether riparian rights are recognized in the upland owner.'
Where such rights are recognized, public rights (except as to naviga-
tion) are subordinated to the upland interests. Where such rights do
not exist, the title to all shore and tidelands vests in the state, to be
disposed of in aid of business and commerce and without reference to
the convenience of the upland owner. Washington has asserted the
latter doctrine as to upland abutting navigable waters.2
B. Nonnavigable Waters Distinguished. The Washington theory of
ownership of waterfront property first distinguishes between land
abutting navigable and nonnavigable waters. The problem as to land
abutting nonnavigable water is comparatively simple. To such land
attach riparian rights, and complexities arise primarily from transitory
boundaries or from conflicts of common law interests.
C. Tide and Shore Lands and Navigability Defined. This state has,
classified abutting navigable waters as (i) uplands, ahd (2) first or
second-class tide or shore land. Paraphrasing the statutes,' land above
the line of high tide or high water of navigable bodies of water is
upland. Shore land borders navigable lakes or streams, not subject to
tidal flow, between the line of ordinary high water and the line of
navigability First-class shore land lies in front of or within two miles
* LL.B., University of Washington, 1948.
1 Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 102 Pac. 1041, 104 Pac. 267
(1909).
2 Ibd.
3 Rz REv. STAT. §§ 7797-5 to 8 [P.P.C. §§ 940-117 to 123].
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of an incorporated city; second class pertains to all other shore land.
First-class tide lands are the beds and shores of tidal waters between
the line of ordinary high tide and the inner harbor line in front of, or
within one mile on either side of, the limits of an incorporated city'
and between the lines of ordinary high and extreme low tide within
two miles of the corporate limits. Second-class tidelands are all other
lands over which the tide ebbs and flows.
Accordingly, before determining the interests in specific waterfront
property, the navigability of the contiguous body of water must be
ascertained. This is a question of fact,5 depending upon such things
as the size, depth, location, and connection with or proximity to other
navigable waters. It is not navigable merely because it will float logs
or other timber products or because there is sufficient depth of water
to float a boat of commercial size.' A lake which is chiefly valuable for
fishing or for pleasure boats of small size is ordinarily not navigable."
Where the state has assumed the navigability of a particular body of
water and sold what would accordingly be shore land, there is no
adverse possession established by the state; the upland or shore land
owner can still contest the navigability and claim the riparian rights
which would attach to land abutting nonnavigable water.,
"Navigable" or "navigability" as intended within the state consti-
tutional provisions of Article i7, the authority for this branch of
Washington property law, applies to such bodies of water which are
capable of being used for the carriage of commerce. ' A slough, used
by boats and for towing logs at high tide, was found to be navigable
though it contained only four to twenty-four inches of water at low
tide." All meandered rivers, meandered sloughs, and navigable waters
in this state are declared by statute to be public highways." But this
is an exception to the general concept of navigability So also are
4 State ex rel McKenzie v. Forrest, 11 Wash. 233, 39 Pac. 684 (1895).
5 Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1921).
6 Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
7A lake one mile long, a quarter-mile wide, and between ten to forty-five feet in
depth which had no visible outlet but had been meandered was held nonnavigable,
although used by small fishing and pleasure boats. Snmvely v. State, 167 Wash. 385,
9 P. (2d) 773 (1932). This case did not mention or specifically overrule an earlier case
holding navigable a lake one and one-half miles long by three-quarters of a mile in
width with an average depth of sixteen feet, similarly used. One forty-five foot steam-
boat carried visitors and pleasure parties but no freight other than small packages.
Kalez v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co 42 Wash. 43, 84 Pac. 395 (1906).
8 Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P. (2d) 773 (1932).
9 Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239, 83 Am. St. 821, 54 L.R.A. 178
(1900).
10 Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 75 Pac. 807 (1904).
11 REef. REv. STAT. § 8407 [P.P.C. § 453-17].
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streams which have not been meandered but which are suitable for
floating logs and timber; if navigable for such purpose, they are public
highways for that purpose, but they are not thereby brought within
the above constitutional provision which includes only such streams as
are highways for general trade and commerce. "2 However, prior rulings
as to navigability should be pleaded in subsequent litigations over the
same or adjacent waterfront property to insure that the same rights
adhere to all the land bordering any particular body of water. 8
Once a body of water is found navigable, the proprietary interests
are divisible between the uplands, which extend to the high water or
high tide line, and the first or second-class tide or shore lands which
lie below The tide or shore lands extend, per statute, from the ordinary
high.water or high tide line to the line of navigability or the inner
harbor line.
The harbors of the state are established and regulated in accordance
with Article 35 of the state constitution. Tins provides that the legis-
lature shall appoint a commission to establish a harbor line in the
navigable waters in front of or within one mile of incorporated cities
beyond which no rights to the water shall be given, leased, or sold. The
commission shall further determine an area which is reserved for land-
ings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navigation and com-
merce. Accordingly, the board of state land connussioners, composed
of the commissioner of public lands, the secretary of state, and the state
treasurer,14 locates the restricted harbor area by establishing the outer
and inner harbor lines, the inner line being between the outer harbor
line and the line of ordinary high tide and not less than fifty nor more
than six hundred feet from the outer line. 5 the one-mile limit for the
harbor line was extended by the legislature to two miles on either side
of incorporated cities,"0 and by judicial interpretation it was held that
the commission was not so limited by Article 15 that it could not
extend harbor lines in front of second-class shore lands.1 ' The inner
harbor line is theoretically the line of navigation,"" and since by statu-
12 Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840 (1901).
Is Both the trial court and appellate court refused to take judicial notice of a prior
holding on the navigability of a particular stream for logs only (by the same trial
court in a prior litigation between the same parties) when the parties admitted the
general navigability of that stream and removed that question from issue. Lownsdale v.
Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909).14 Rzm. Rnv. STAT. §§ 7797-10, 11 [P.P.C. §§940-63, 65.].
15 Id. §§ 7797-2, 3, 4 [P.P.C. §§ 940-111, 113, 115].
10 Ram. and BAL. CODE §§ 6744-6769, R. .. R. STAT. §§ 7961-7993.
17 Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 160 Pac. 310 (1916).
%s State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913).
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tory definition both first and second-class shore lands extend from
ordinary high water to the line of navigability, this boundary is deter-
mined by the comnssion when it establishes the harbor area. Thus
owners of both classes of shore land take subject to the possibility of
having their outer boundary established by the comnssion."0 Where
such harbor lines have not been established and the outer boundary to
shore land is being litigated, the court sets the boundary by deternmn-
ing the line of navigability 2 In instances where no harbor line is
established and the court can not determine navigability of the water
at the point in question, the court will not recognize the preferential
right of purchase in the upland owner as extending past the mean low
water.2 This limits the preference since otherwise it would extend to
the line of navigability 22 The legislature in 1895 confirmed the line
of navigability as the boundary for state grants and provided that
shore lands of the second class shall not be sold by tracts or lots (as
are firsf-class tide or shore lands22), but by measurement on the mean-
der line, subject to the right of the state to thereafter fix harbor lines. 4
D State and Federal Rtghts as Affectng Proprzetary Interests:
Once the proprietary interests have been deterrmned and the bound-
aries established, the intersts may be traced back to either federal or
state grants. The United States originally held the shores of navigable
waters in trust until the territories became states, and retained control
over the navigable waters only for the purposes of navigation. The
state of Washington asserted ownership to all beds and shores of navi-
gable waters, including tide and shore lands, by Article 17 of the state
constitution. Section 2 of the same article disclaimed all title in tide,
swamp, or overflowed lands patented by the United States. This dis-
claimer clause was applied to both tide and shore lands obtained
through federal patent prior to the adoption of the state constitution,
where such land lay above the meander line of the government survey 2'
19 Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 160 Pac. 310 (1916).
20 REM REv. STAT. § 9733.
21 Muir v. Johnson, 49 Wash. 66, 94 Pac. 899 (1908). (Injunction against obstruc-
tion below low water line denied.)
22 State ex rel McKenzie v. Forrest, 11 Wash. 227, 39 Pac. 684 (1895).
23 REM. REv. STAT. § 7797-110 [P.P.C. § 940-423].
24 This statute, originally REM. & BAL. CODE § 6761, was reenacted in 1897 as REM.
REv. STAT. § 7979 and again in 1927 with REM. REv. STAT. § 7797-120 [P.P.C. §
940-593] pertaining to tideland and § 7797-121 [P.P.C. § 940-595] applicable to shore
land. The enactments of 1927, while not verbatim, are substantially the same as the
prior statutes, and as they do not specifically supersede the prior legislation, it would
appear that both laws are yet in effect.
25 Hewitt-Lea Lumber Co. v. King Co., 113 Wash. 431, 194 Pac. 377 (1920) (shore
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The Supreme Court of Washington was quick to find that the state
had absolute title to all beds of navigable waters and that an abutting
owner held no riparian or littoral rights to the waters or shores."8 The
court also demed that a federal grant prior to statehood vested any
riparian rights or disposed of any land below the high water mark of
navigable water where the meander line lay above such water mark,
as such land had been held in trust by the federal government for the
future commonwealth. No common law rights to navigable water have
existed since adoption of the constitution."'
This view was affirmed in Sh vely v. Bowlby2 where the U.S. Su-
preme Court declared:
Grants by congress of portions of the public lands within a Territory to
settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters,
convey, of their own force, no title or right below ugh water mark, and do
not impair the title and dominion of the future state when created, but leave
the question of the use of the shores by the owners of the uplands to the
sovereign control of each state, subject only to the rights vested by the Con-
stitution in the United States.
The United States Supreme Court also determined that the right of
the United States in the navigable waters of the several states is limited
to control thereof for purposes of navigation, and that under Article 17
of the Washington state constitution, title to tidelands passed to the
state, upon its creation, in full proprietary ownership. 2 These two
decisions were followed in Washington"° when the court specifically
denied that restriction of federal sovereignty to a control of navigation
implied any limitation to the power of the state.
The disclaimer provision of Article 17, Section 2, excepts from the
rule vesting all tide and shore land in the state land granted by federal
patent prior to statehood and which, though lying beyond the high tide
or high water line, was included within the patented boundaries of the
government survey meander line. These meander lines were the lines
whereby the survey mapped the area and plotted the bodies of water.
They did not always accurately follow the outline of the body of water
but in some cases cut over upland or across the water. Thus the bound-
land). Federal patent prior to statehood vested title to tideland lying above the
meander line. Scurry v. Jones, 4 Wash. 468, 30 Pac. 726 (1892).26 Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 L.R.A. 632 (1891).2 7 Kalez v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 42 Wash. 43, 83 Pac. 395 (1906).
28 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 58 (1893).2 9 Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington R. Co., 255 U.S. 56 (1921).
80 Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac. 811 (1913), Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash.
227, 149 Pac. 951 (1915).
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aries of such prior federal patents are either (i) the line of ordinary
high water or high tide or (2) the meander line, whichever extends
farther from the upland. The interest of the state m such shore or
tideland passed to the grantees of a federal patent as fully as it would
by a special state grant."L The boundaries of land granted by federal
patent are determined by the plat; its notes, lines and descriptions
become a part of the grant or deed."2 When by such means the meander
line is found to be above the line of ordinary high water, the grant
extends to the water line, for a water boundary to land under federal
patent is the high water line or the meander line. The state can exert
no claim to the land above the high water line where the meander line
is above the water line, but such land passes under the patent although
not specifically included in the meander line description. If the meander
line lies beyond the high water line and into the water, the shore or
tideland between the meander line and the high water line was included
by the grant and waived by the state under the disclaimer clause."3
Thus the meander line is an actual boundary to uplands only under a
federal patent prior to statehood, and where such meander line lies
below the high tide or high water line.
E. Proprietary Interests in Waterfront Property" Once the class of
proprietary interest is determined, the rights that accrue thereto can be
distinguished. Our court has consistently denied to upland owners any
riparian rights to the navigable waters to which their land is contigu-
ous, or to the abutting tide or shore lands." As to the uplands, there is
no right to the water for navigation or irrigation or to access across
abutting shore or tidelands. In fact, the state can entirely divert the
water away from the property without consideration of the upland
owner. Nor do cities fare better in their rights to tideland against the
superior right of the state. Actually then, in regard to uplands and any
81 Scurry v. Jones, 4 Wash. 468, 30 Pac. 726 (1892).
82 Cogswell v. Forrest, 14 Wash. 1, 43 Pac. 1098 (1896).
83 Washougal Transportation Co. v. Dalles, Etc., Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac.
742 (1902).
34 The upland owner was denied access to navigable water across abutting tidelands
that had been conveyed to another by the state. Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co.,
54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909). The owner of upland bordering a navigable lake
had no common law riparian right to the water of such lake for the purpose of irriga-
tion. State ex rel. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Superior Ct., 70 Wash. 422, 126 Pac. 945
(1912). No riparian rights were gained from a federal patent. Brace v. Hergert Mill
Co., 49 Wash. 326, 95 Pac. 278 (1908). Upland owners have no action against the state
for diversion of a navigable stream entirely away from the property. Newell v. Loeb,
77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac. 811 (1913). A city acquired no rights by a plat over tidelands
prior to admission of the statte into the union, but the title to tidelands vested in the
state on its creation, and the state could dispose of it as it wished. Scott v. Standard
Oil Co., 183 Wash. 123, 48 P.(2d) 593 (1935).
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supposed water rights thereto, the term waterfront property is
deceptive.
An upland owner has some rights, however, based upon the statutory
preference of purchase of the abutting tide and shore lands. When the
state determines to sell particular tide or shore land, the owners of the
upland are given a preferential right to purchase the abutting tide or
shore land; this preference is of thirty days duration for second-class
and of sixty days for first-class tide or shore lands.8" The thirty-day
preference is computed from the date of personal service for resident
or the date of mailing of notice to nonresident owners of the particular
upland; for first-class lands the preference is computed from publi-
cation prior to the filing of the appraisement by the comniissioner of
public lands, and there is no provision for personal service."8
This preferential right has enabled an owner of upland on a navi-
gable lake to enjoin the use of the shore land for access to a houseboat
moored in front of the land. However, this right was not so extensive
as to secure removal of the houseboat as an obstruction in navigable
waters. Such an obstruction, if it were a nuisance, could be abated only
in an action by the state and did not constitute a trespass to any littoral
rights of the uplands.
Contrasted to the demal of riparian rights in the uplands, such
rights exist in both land abutting nonnavigable waters,8" and in tide
and shore lands. Since the state holds title in fee to the beds of navi-
gable waters, a conveyance by the state to one other than the owner
of the uplands vests clear title against which the upland owner has no
claim through riparian or littoral rights."9 The court has declared that
the right of the owner of second-class shore land extends to the line
of navigation, that the right is substituted for the denied riparian pro-
prietorslp, and that by such right one can improve his holding by the
erection of docks and piers up to the line of navigability 40 Also a con-
veyance of the tideland of a navigable river and of a slough subject to
tidal flow carries title free from any claim by the upland owner for the
use of any part of the premises below ordinary high tide; compliance
"I Rni. RLy. STAT. §§ 7797-112, 121 [P.P.C. §§ 940-427, 595].38 RE= REv. STAT. §§ 7797-111, 112, 121 [P.P.C. §§ 940-425, 427, 595].
37 Van Siclen v. Muir, 46 Wash. 38, 89 Pac. 188 (1907).88 Riparian rights in a stream were protected from interference by diversion of the
source, a navigable lake, even though there would be no riparian rights in the lake
itself, and whether or not the land had directly abutted thereon. New Whatcom v.
Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735, 54 L.R.A. 190 (1901).80 Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911).
40 State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913).
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with the statutes relating to boom companies41 gives exclusive use of
the beds and shores conveyed except for a free passageway between
the boom and one shore sufficient for the ordinary purposes of navi-
gation.4"
Because of the varying values of different classes of water property,
it is of the utmost importance to establish the classification and conse-
quent boundaries of a given piece of land, and if necessary obtain the
abutting tide or shore land for protection.
F Descriptive Boundaries and Meander Lines: In addition to the
question of navigability, locating a water boundary may require an
interpretation of the deed under which a holder's claim is established.
This presents difficulties, whether the land be on navigable or non-
navigable waters, when the descriptions are in terms of the original
government surveys or refer to the water itself."2 Although meandered
streams are public highways by statute, the fact that such streams are
meandered does not determine navigability '
The rule has evolved that streams themselves are the actual bound-
ary though the conveyance is in terms of the meander line." By the
laws of Washington, the boundary line of all navigable streams is the
line of ordinary high water, while with nonnavigable streams the
boundary is the thread of the stream."8 Litigation has arisen to dispute
a government survey and plat where there has been a wide variance
between the actual location of rivers and the locations as established
upon the plats by the meander lines. Where an original call specified
the west bank of a river and thence southerly along the west bank, the
court rejected an engineer's testimony of his visual survey of the river
location as insufficient to impreach the government survey although the
actual acreage was double that platted. It was there held that it must
be indisputably established that the plat was the result of gross negli-
gence or fraud, that there was no river near the spot indicated, and that
adopting the stream as it is actually located would increase the paten-
tee's land to such an extent as to be fraudulent or wholly inequitable.
Nor does a statement of acreage established from the plats limit the
extent of the grant, since that would establish meander lines as bound-
41 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 7797-134, 135, 136 [P.P.C. §§ 940-243, 245, 247].
42 Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909).
43 Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 Pac. 1062 (1922).
44 Ra. REv. STAT. § 8407 [P.P.C. § 453-17]. Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636,
64 Pac. 840 (1901).
45 Jeffries v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
48 Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 Pac. 1062 (1922).
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aries, which is not the case.,' The meander line and the high water line
may each be presumptive but not conclusive proof of the other.48
The court has had difficulty interpreting deeds which are specific in
their description as to which part of the stream was intended as the
boundary Riparian rights were not in issue when the above rule was
applied, and it would be very important to have the intentions accu-
rately drafted into any conveyance affecting land abutting nonnavi-
gable water or in distinguishing between the rights of upland and tide
or shore land.
Where the descriptions intermingled the terms "bank of the river"
and "meander of the river" and the river in question was navigable,
the court has held that the former term would control, as in any event
navigability would destroy any clain past the bank."9 But what would
be the ruling had the river been nonnavigable and riparian rights to
the thread of the stream been in issue? The specific use of "bank" of a
nonnavigable stream has been held to limit the interest conveyed to
the specific boundary with no right to the bed of the stream, though
the court conceded that a general description of a nonnavigable water
boundary would mean the thread of the stream." Where the descrip-
tion was "ten feet east of the course of the stream," the boundary was
held to be a parallel line ten feet east of the thread and not of the bank
of the stream."' Similarly, if the plat specifies courses and distances
and shows that a strip of land between the water and land conveyed was
not included, a sale by lot number will not give title to the high water
line, but will be restricted to the specifications of the plat as staked
upon the ground."2 Where the grantor holds both the upland and the
tide or shore land, a conveyance should clearly express what interests
are being conveyed rather than risk interpretation.
II. CHANGING WATER COURSES
One of the common problems in this field is the location of water
boundaries which have changed by accretion, reliction, or avulsion,
especially when the boundaries separate uplands from the tide or shore
lands.
47 Rue v. Ore. & Wash. R. Co., 109 Wash 436, 186 Pac. 1074 (1920).
48 Washougal Transp. Co. v. Dalles Etc., Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 742(1902).
40 Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac. 811 (1913).
50 Commssioners Comm. Waterway Dist. No. 2 v. Seattle Factory Sites Co., 76
Wash. 181, 135 Pac. 1042 (1913).51 Rossi v. Sophia, 163 Wash. 173, 300 Pac. 522 (1931). Note, 6 WAsH3. L. REv. 178.
52 Spinning v. Pugh, 65 Wash. 490, 118 Pac. 635 (1911).
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Black's Law Dictionary defines accretion as the addition to land of
portions of soil by gradual and imperceptible deposition through the
operation of natural causes. It is of two kinds: (i) alluvon, or the
washing up of sand or soil so as to form solid ground, and (2) derelic-
tion, as when the sea shrinks below the usual water mark. Avulsion
is the removal of a considerable quantity of soil from the land of one
and its deposit upon or annexation to the land of another, suddenly and
by perceptible action of water, and includes a sudden change of
channel.
The normal rule of avulsion is that when a boundary stream sud-
denly abandons the old channel and creates a new one, or suddenly
washes from one bank a considerable body of land and deposits it on
another, the boundary does not change with the changed course of the
stream."
The leading accretion cases are federal and are not concerned with
distinguishing between shore land and upland, but simply state that
when a boundary line is any line of any water course, gradual shifting
of that line by either reliction or accretion results in a shift of the
boundary line." This rule was later held to apply to both tide and fresh
water regardless of the size or navigability of the water course."
It is debatable whether the rule of accretion is a riparian or littoral
right or is simply a convenient means of retaining an identifiable bound-
ary 58 The Washington rule of accretion has evolved from judicial
interpretations which varied, depending upon whether the waterway
was navigable, whether the boundaries to tide or shore land were in
issue, and whether the state was asserting ownership to the shores of
navigable waters.
In addition to Article 17, a statute of x899, reenacted in 1927, pro-
vides that accretions to any tide or shore lands after such lands have
been sold, belong to the state. There is a further provision for survey
and sale of such accretion with a thirty-day preference to purchase to
the owner of the adjacent tide or shore land. This legislation is the
53 Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205. Pac. 1062 (1922). Where a violent flood
had changed the course of a stream, the court recognized the rule of avulsion, but by
finding adverse possession in the present occupant (who by the change had become the
adjoining owner) quieted title to the land separated by the altered course. Nixon v.
Merchant, 19 Wn.(2d) 97, 141 P.(2d) 411 (1943).
54 Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1917).
55 Jefferies v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
56 Ghlone v. State of Washington, Commercial Waterway District No. 2 of King
County, 26 Wn. (2d) 635, 175 P. (2d) 955 (1946).
5T Rxa . REv. STAT. § 7797-123 [P.P.C. §940-599).
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principal stumbling block to the solution of pr6blems of conflicting
interests of waterfront property
In cases where the state was not a party and where the divisible
upland and shore land interests were not in issue, the normal rule of
accretions was applied to determine that accretions to the banks be-
long to the upland owner."8 Where land had been excluded from sepa-
rate surveys of either side of a river that had gradually changed course
in the interim, so that the second survey located the river in its altered
course, it was held that the accreted land passed to the owner of the
abutting land even though the patent description was in terms of the
prior survey 11 Similarly, where a stream widened from about 225 feet
at the 1862 survey to over 700 feet at the time of litigation, with a
decrease of eighty acres to a particular tract, it was held that whether
the stream was navigable or not the boundary changed with the
stream. It was there determined that the owners on either side of the
stream were not adjoining owners, and whether the changes were by
avulsion or accretion the benefiting owner held'by adverse possession
since the time of the last possi6le avulsion, and that R:E1. R.v STAT.
§§ 947 to 949 [P.P.C. §§ 13-1, 13-3, 13-5] (pertaining to the restora-
tion of lost boundaries) did not apply 80
The rule of accretion provides that land gradually deposited upon
one bank by the action of the river belongs to the owner of such land.
Such addition of land often results in a loss to the owner of the oppo-
site bank. This loss is recognized by the rule. In contrast to this rule,
applied where the litigation does not involve the state or the conflicting
interests of upland and shore land owners, the Washington court ap-
plied a rather incongruous rule when only one eroded bank was in
litigation. It was held that where the bank is perpendicular and forms
a retaining wall both above and below ordinary high tide, the bound-
ary line between tideland and upland is a perpendicular plane, and
neither party has the right to complain of the encroachment of the
other if the plane is not crossed."1 It has also been held that where high
and low water were marks upon such perpendicular banks and there
were no shore lands when the uplands were granted, the state had no
claim to shore lands created by erosion within the boundaries of a
private claim or to fills in the river caused by artificial means. The fills
could be removed as a nuisance by the state, but not claimed for use
58 Spinning v. Pugh, 65 Wash. 490, 118 Pac. 635 (1911).
59 Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 Pac. 1062 (1922).
00 Glen v. Warner, 199 Wash. 160, 90 P. (2d) 734 (1939).
61. Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909).
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or sale to another.2 This rule was set forth in litigation where the
parties were concerned only with the action of the water upon one
bank, but it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the erosion here and
that resulting from a changing water boundary as determined by the
recognized law of accretion. It would appear impossible to align the
rationale of the rule applied where only one bank is in litigation to that
of the rule of accretion as applied to the eroded bank against which
the water course has moved, unless the former were restricted to in-
stances of duplicated circumstances. The rule that declares that no
shore land shall be created by erosion upon a perpendicular bank
would appear to prevail in any action against the upland owner by the
state or any other shore land interest. But it should be overruled or
held inapplicable m an action for the accreted land brought by the
holder of the land on the opposite shore of the altered watercourse.
Otherwise, the "perpendicular bank" rule would appear to be a de-
fense for the owner of the eroded bank and to be in direct conflict
with the rule of accretions.
In actions where the state has been a party, the issue has generally
been the ownership of the entire bed of the watercourse as distinguished
from the shore or tideland. Dry beds of navigable waters, abandoned
by changes of course prior to statehood, and passed by accretion or
federal patent to the abutting owners, are free from any claim of the
state, but when the change of course occurs after statehood, the state
retains title to the old channel.2 Also the statute vesting accretions in
the state is operative only where accretion occurs after the state di-
vested itself of title to the tide or shore land; otherwise accretion
would merely be an addition to land owned by the state."
Other litigation over the beds of navigable watercourses has arisen
with regard to the interests of the commercial waterway districts.
Under the WATERWAYS ACT of i911, any claim of the state to the beds
of navigable waters is vested in the district when such beds shall have
been abandoned by the improvement of the navigational facilities of
the waterway The disposal of such beds is given to the waterway dis-
trict in order to render financial aid in accomplishing the improve-
ment. "
02 Washougal Transp. Co. v. Dalles, Etc., Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 742
(1902).
68 George v. Pierce County, 111 Wash. 495, 191 Pac. 406 (1920).
64 Strand v. State, 16 Wn.(2d) 107, 132 P.(2d) 1011 (1943).
65 Rm. REv. STAT. § 9732 [P.P.C. § 431-35]. Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137
Pac. 811 (1913) (statute found valid).
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The effect of an artificial or natural alteration of the boundary be-
tween shore and upland upon the relative proprietary interests has
not been decided by the Washington court. Similarly, the courts have
left undetermined the interests of the state contrasted to those of the
individual, e.g., when A dredges a private anchorage, thereby admit-
ting the tide over his property and creating new tideland. Where a
waterway district had obtained by warranty deed land through which
a new channel was dredged, the district was held to be owner of the
new tideland created in the channel. The court did not decide whether
title to the new tideland was obtained from the title to the land through
which the channel was dredged or had vested in the state by virtue of
Article 17, as in any event such title had been granted to the district
by the WATERWAYS ACT of 1911.6 But what is the position of A?
Does he surrender his claim to a superior statutory or constitutional
claim of the state? This appears unlikely as the court here doubted
that Article 17 would include tideland artificially created after adop-
tion of the constitution. It would appear that REm. REv STAT. § 7797-
123 [P.P.C. § 940-599] (vesting title to accretions to tide and shore
land in the state) would be inapplicable unless a heretofore unknown
definition of "accretions" was found to include changes immediately
and artificially created. It is to be remembered that Washougal Transp.
Co. v. Dalles, etc. Nay. Co. 7 stated that the state could remove arti-
ficial fills from a river as a nuisance but could not claim them as shore
land.
In another recent action8 between the state and an upland owner,
there were several issues involving water boundaries, but the shore
land question was expressly reserved. The court recognized the gen-
60 Commercial Waterway Dist. #1 v. C. J. Larson, 26 Wn. (2d) 219, 173 P. (2d)
531 (1946). REar. REV. STAT. § 9732 [P.P.C. § 431-35].
67 Washougal Transp. Co. v. Dalles, Etc., Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 742
(190 6 28hione v. State of Wash., 26 Wn. (2d) 635, 175 P. (2d) 955 (1946). A subsequent
holder under a federal patent (in which the description on two sides was the inter-
secting meander lines of two rivers) quieted title to the land many years after the
rivers had been abandoned. Only dry river beds, largely obliterated, now marked the
boundaries of the federal patent, and the court found that the second river had changed
course between the time of the survey and when it was abandoned. The state claimed
the land between the boundaries of the river as shown by the meander lines of the 1865
survey and the abandoned bed, the waterway district claimed only the abandoned beds
of both rivers; the upland owner claimed all land included within the enlarged bounda-
ries by the rule of accretion. The waterway district was awarded the channel of the
first river abandoned in the course of improvements of that waterway by the district;
the bed of the second river when abandoned was awarded to the state since the district
only contributed with the federal government to the diversion of that river; the abutting
upland owner was awarded all land up to the banks of the apandoned beds under the
description of his title.
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ral property rule of accretion as benefiting the abutting upland and
that it was applicable to governments as well as to individuals, reason-
ing that the abutting owner should not be held accountable for his
gains since he has no remedy for his losses. The court denied that
Article 17 vested title in the state to all lands covered by navigable
waters in i889 and to all lands which have since been submerged in
navigable waters, recognizing that it would deprive owners of the
benefits of recession and create a difficult artificial boundary The
statute pertaining to accretions was held to apply only to tide and
shore lands previously conveyed by the state and not to accretions to
uplands; accretions to uplands thereby passed to the upland owner
whose boundary continued to be the high water line.
Now let us attempt to correlate the rules previously presented with
the hypothetical shown in the accompanying figure.
A and B own upland on opposite sides of the river, as shown in posi-
tion one. The shore land on the east side of the river (B's side) has
been conveyed to C and on it has been built a boathouse. A fixed
boundary separates B's property on the east from property of D
Now let us attempt to discern the effect of an altered watercourse
upon the various proprietary interests. C's shore land interest would
appear to be precarious. As the river moves westward to position four,
the newly accreted shore land below the high water line on the east
bank would vest in the state by REM. Rv STAT. § 7797-123 [P.P.C.
§ 940-599], and following behind the high water line would be the
claim of upland owner B Under the rule given in the Gkione case,6"
that accretion shall benefit the upland owner, B would seemingly take
the former shore land, boathouse and all. The boundaries to the up-
lands of A and B would then be the high water lines of the river as in
position four; B would take the benefit of the property added by accre-
tion and A would suffer the loss; C's rights would appear to be ex-
tinguished. If C's rights were thus extinguished, what would be the
effect of the two statutes giving preferences of purchase of shore land;
would the preference of purchase of accreted shore land given to
abutting shore land owners ' prevail over the preference given to up-
land owners of buying abutting shore land?71 The preference to the
shore land owner would appear to prevail if his rights otherwise had
not been extinguished.
69 Ibzd.
70 REm. REV. STAT. § 7797-123 [P.P.C. § 940-599].
7i RM. REv. STAT. §§ 7797-112, 121 [P.P.C. §§ 940-427, 595].
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plopp rTy OWNED BY D
Then what would be the respective interests if the river moves east-
ward to position two? Arguably there might be no newly accreted
shore lands on the east bank. Former upland would have become shore
land by the erosive action of the water on the east bank, but would
this be considered newly accreted shore land to winch the state could
make claim? There would be a conflict between the rule of the
Waskougal case ' and the form of accretion defined as dereliction or
72 Washougal Transp. Co. v. Dalles, Etc., Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 742(1902).
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reliction. Aluvion shore land would be on the west bank of the river in
position two, but if the shore land had not been sold previously by the
state, the statute vesting such accretions in the state 8 would not be
applicable. Seemngly, the boundary to the properties of A and B
would still be the high water line of the river in position two, and A
would hold title to the former shore land upon which the boathouse
was situated. Again C's position would be questionable; should newly
accreted shore land under the state's statutory claim include shore
land created by the erosion? Seemingly, C's position should be between
the line of navigability and the high water line of the river in position
two, with the high water line separating the interests of B and C. But
arguably, if the shore land interest can be lost by a moving water-
course revesting such interests in the state through the alluvial form
of accretion, why cannot such interests be lost through reliction? Both
forms constitute accretion and create "new" shore land to which the
state nght make claim.
What results if the river gradually changed its course eastward and
crossed the fixed boundary between the upland of B and the land of D
to position three? The boundary of the upland of A would be the high
water line of the west bank of the river in that position, and seemingly
much of B's land would have passed to A by the rule of accretion. C
would either still hold the shore land on the east bank or have lost
such interest to the state, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. But
would the land of D then become upland to which the rights of accre-
tion would attach? By statutory definition it could be so argued.
The problem would become extremely vexatious should the river
retrace its movements to the original course diagramed as position one.
Would the claim of B as the former upland owner be revived or would
the property of D follow the line of ordinary high water as upland?
Seemingly, once fixed, the boundary between the properties of B and D
should remain so. But as the river retraces its movement, either D,
despite his fixed boundary, must claim as an upland owner or the
claim of B as the upland owner must revive in what had been his
original holding, to have the title to such land vest in anyone. The state
might claim only the newly accreted shore land at the time of litiga-
tion, for the Gkone case74 denied that the state had any claim under
Article 1 7 to land once covered by navigable water but since uncovered.
The statutory right to newly accreted shore land would seenungly
73 REmi. REV. STAT. § 7797-123 [P.P.C. § 940-599].
4 Ghione v. State of Wash., 26 Wn.(2d) 635, 175 P.(2d) 955 (1946).
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give no greater clai to land that had completed the transformation
from shore land to upland by the continued movement of the river.
In any event, the interests of C would appear extingished by the
application of the rule of accretion benefiting the abutting upland
owner or by the statute vesting the new shore land in the state. C's
only interest as a shore land owner might be the preference to purchase
newly accreted shore land. 5 Yet the shore land owner holds under a
conveyance of the entire shore land over given sections of the river.
Is such a conveyance a grant of riparian rights in the form of an ease-
ment or a conveyance of specific property to which such rights attach?
Determining whether the rule of accretion is a riparian right or a means
of retainig an identifiable boundary would resolve whether a convey-
ance of shore land is an irrevocable right of access to the water or a
peculiar type of grant subject to termination and to which the state
holds a form of reversion.
It is submitted that this whole problem might be simplified in two
ways: First, R.!. Rv STAT. § 7797-123 [P.P.C. § 940-599] is argu-
ably unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the
federal Constitution. Neither the state nor the federal government
may deprive one of property without due process of law 76 The courts
have declared that riparian rights exist in tide and shore lands. These
rights are such property that the deprivation thereof by the state could
be a violation of due process. The right of access to the water and to
the use of the land for private purposes are rights constituting property
whether or not the court resolves the debate as to the rule of accretion
constituting a riparian right. The state has defined the boundaries of
shore lands to the water line and the line of navigability, and yet claims
a form of reversion contingent upon soil being deposited upon the sub-
merged land. What is the nature of a conveyance by the state of tide
or shore land? Whether it is a right to the use of the water or land
between the line of high water and the line of navigability or a grant
of the land between such boundaries with the accompanying rights to
the water by which the land is submerged, the grantee has received
property for which he is entitled the protection of due process. The
court has recognized that the state cannot artificially expose shore
lands so conveyed and divest the owner of his rights." Can the deed
75 Rxm. Rxv. STAT. § 7797-123 EP.P.C. § 940-599].
76 Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F. (2d) 262. (C.C.A. 4th 1928).
77 State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913). The court treated the
right to access to water as the principal value of shore land. Also where water is arti-
ficially lowered and land previously submerged becomes shore land and clearly without
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be less effective to extend to the line of navigability by the intervention
of fortuitous and natural causes?
The right to devote the land to any legitimate use is "property"
within the due process clause, and legislatures may not under the guise
of police power impose unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions upon
the use of private property 78 The legislature must determine such use
to be inconsistent with public health, safety, morals, or general welfare
to seize property Certainly a statute which arguably forbids sub-
merging one's own land to tides or waterways at penalty of seizure
and sale by the state does not involve such a determination.
Second, the courts should interpret Article 1 7 as of its adoption and
not to subsequently created tide or shore land. The state's interest in
tide or shore land and the accretion thereto would then be limited to
those not yet conveyed, subject of course to the right of emnent do-
main.
With the state limited to an interest in the beds of navigable water-
courses, the courts could more easily resolve problems of water bound-
aries. Riparian rights should be based upon the right of access to water.
Then by extending the rule applied when access was artificially re-
moved by the state7 1 to removal by accretion or private alteration, the
interests of property owners would be protected except for the recog-
nized risk of erosion. Without undoing all Washington concepts of
waterfront property, the distinctions between lands bordering navi-
gable and nonnavigable waters as well as between upland and shore
land could be sustained. Fixed boundaries would be maintained un-
affected by water boundaries. The problem would then be reduced to
the boundaries of present shore lands, such added area was held to belong to those
who had bought the shore land, and their boundary, the line of navigability, extends to
its new location.
The court declared that the right of these shore owners to relief is recognized under
the holding of Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911). There can be no
remedy unless there be an antecedent wrong. The wrong lies in taking from the shore
owners the rights to riparian proprietorship, i.e., in extending the line of navigation
after deeding the land. The deeds were executed in virtue of the statute; there can
be no implied warranty, and there is no express warranty; consequently the only
remedy left, under the reasoning of the Bilger case, is to hold that the deeds to shore
owners carry title to the line of navigability as it may theretofore be fixed.
If the land to be artificially created was a reliction, no question as to its ownership
could arise. The state being the owner of shores and beds of navigable lakes and
having made a grant of the shore with the right of access to navigable water, it would
seem that its legal position is no different from that of a private grantor who had made
a deal under similar circumstances.
This same view is in statutory form. REm. REv. STAT. § 9733.
78 State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
86 A.L.R. 654 (1928).
79 State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913).
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determining navigability, locating the actual watercourse and the high
tide or water marks and the line of navigability which, per statute,
are the boundaries to the severable proprietary interests, and affixing
the rights that attach thereto. Riparian rights, including the right of
accretion and of access to the water, would continue to attach to tide
and shore land and land abutting nonnavigable waters, and be denied
to uplands. But litigation would be lessened, the boundaries and in-
terests of the various proprietary interests would be more readily and
satisfactorily distinguishable, and established riparian rights would
benefit owners as the rule of accretion intended.
